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A legal analysis of Australian criminal cases involving defendants with autism 
spectrum disorder charged with online sexual offending  
This paper examines how the symptomology of the small number of individuals with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) charged with online sexual offenses in Australia are 
established during legal arguments and conceived by the judiciary to impact legal liability 
and offending behavior. This study aims to provide empirical support for the proposition 
that judicial discourses regarding the connection between ASD and online sexual 
offending, including conduct related to child exploitation material (CEM), have little 
bearing on overall questions of criminal liability or use of alternative penal dispositions. It 
does so by exploring a sample of nine recent Australian criminal cases involving ten 
rulings to examine how evidence of ASD is raised in legal arguments in ways that suggest 
a diagnosed condition may have contributed significantly to the alleged wrongdoing. We 
conclude by suggesting current Australian judicial practice requires more sensitivity to the 
impact of clinical factors associated with ASD in shaping alternative supervisory and non-
custodial dispositions for individuals convicted of online sexual offenses. 
Keywords: autism spectrum disorders; Asperger’s Syndrome; sexual offending; child 














Declaration of conflicting interests: 
 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, 
or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
Abbreviations 
American Psychiatric Association – APA 
Autism Spectrum Disorder(s) – ASD(s) 
Child Exploitation Material – CEM 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fifth Edition) – DSM-5 





Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are neurodevelopmental conditions characterized by 
restricted repetitive behaviors and impairments in reciprocal social interactions and 
communication (Wing, 1997). The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) identifies two core 
areas of impairment in ASD which are found to vary across individuals, symptoms and levels of 
severity. These two core domains are persistent impairments in social communication and social 
interaction and restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (APA, 2013). It is 
imperative these features inherent in ASD are recognized, diagnosed and understood, specifically 
in terms of how they can contribute to certain types of criminal offending, and sex offenses in 
particular (Ray, Marks, & Bray-Garretson, 2004). For example, repetitive or obsessive behaviors 
may contribute to offenses related to child exploitation material (CEM) by individuals with ASD 
(Mogavero, 2016). However, there is currently a lack of clear empirical research exploring this 
association.  
What is clear is that many individuals with ASD are found to have substantial collections 
of pornographic material, often involving children, or thousands of unopened computer files that 
are likely to have been gathered as part of the ritualistic nature of ASD. This can raise the 
prospect of criminal prosecution and potentially lengthy periods of incarceration or community 
supervision. However, individuals with ASD can be unaware of some of the broader issues 
regarding CEM, including where and how the files were obtained, who might be able to access 
them and the consequences for the minors depicted in the images. Crucially, they may not even 
consider something that is illegal to be so freely accessible on the internet given their literal view 
of the world (Mesibov & Sreckovic, 2017).  
The case of Mr. C reported by Brendel, Bodkin, Hauptman and Ornstein (2002), aptly 
illustrates how ASD can be linked to an excessive obsession with pornography. Mr. C spent 
hours with his collection of thousands of pornographic videos and regularly accessed 
pornographic websites. He also had a huge collection of paper dolls that were created by using 
images from both mainstream and pornographic magazines that he engaged with for at least five 
hours per day. Mr. C reported that these activities helped to reduce his anxiety and make up for 
an “unrewarding life”, which included a “sexual lack” in his relationship (Brendel et al., 2002, p. 
167).  
Individuals may also use the internet for sexual education or to satisfy sexual needs due 
to a lack of outlets with peers or friends (Attwood, Hénault, & Dubin, 2014). However, despite 
lower than average levels of social maturity, many individuals with ASD may have an average or 
above average intelligence. This can create an interest in befriending people who are 
significantly younger than themselves but relate at the same social, emotional and intellectual 
levels (see Cutler, 2013). Individuals with ASD may also be completely unaware they are 
committing a criminal offense, as viewing CEM may result from impaired recognition of the 
facial expressions, such as fear, in the illicit images (Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013; Woodbury-
Smith et al., 2005). Moreover, individuals with ASD may inadvertently view CEM because of 
their inability to correctly guess the age of the person(s) in the images, which can be exacerbated 
by the fact that sometimes the physical distinctions between an adult and a child can be blurry. 
These issues need to be considered given the illegality and severity of CEM offenses are 
determined by the apparent age of the victims in the images possessed by the offender 
(Mahoney, 2009).  
While it is clear behavioral traits associated with ASD have an impact on reducing legal 
culpability and sentences for various types of offenses (Allely & Creaby-Attwood, 2016; 
Creaby-Attwood & Allely, 2017; Freckelton, 2011), there is limited research examining broader 
trends for specific types of sexual offending in English-speaking jurisdictions. Dubin and 
Horowitz (2017) highlight this lack of research is closely related to the general lack of awareness 
amongst law enforcement agencies, criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors or judges that clients 
or suspects might have an intellectual disability, such as ASD, that can significantly impact 
interactions with justice professionals. Such conceptions of procedural fairness, as well as 
knowledge of the importance of appropriate diversionary strategies, is generally absent in formal 
legal records. While some behavioral factors related to ASD are recognized as potential 
mitigating explanations for certain forms of transnational online financial crime or computer 
hacking (Kibbie, 2012; Mann, Warren, & Kennedy, 2018), they also have more immediate 
implications given the recognition that innate vulnerabilities associated with any high-
functioning males with ASD (Cooper & Allely, 2017) may increase the likelihood of being 
accused of sexual offenses, particularly those involving the possession of CEM (Dubin & 
Horowitz, 2017; Freckelton, 2011).  
This range of intersecting factors requires detailed consideration, particularly when men 
diagnosed with ASD are detected and prosecuted for accessing CEM. This is particularly salient 
in light of the potential moral reprobation associated with any actual or virtual sexual activity 
with children, which can readily dilute reasoned concern over the alleged offender’s neurological 
vulnerabilities. Our objective is to contribute to the growing body of critical knowledge about the 
various facets of neurolaw (McCay & Ryan, in press), to determine how the various neurological 
and behavioural facets of ASD emerge in formal legal arguments and judicial discourses that 
inform determining criminal liability and sentencing specifically for CEM offences. 
2 Method 
As part of a broader examination of the prosecution of individuals diagnosed with ASD for a 
range of criminal offences, this study examines a sample of ten reported Australian judicial 
decisions between 1 January 2017 and 1 May 2018 involving defendants charged with a sexual 
offence involving an online component. The time period examined is significant, as it involved a 
relative peak in the number of reported online sex offending cases that has since continued. In 
each case the defendant raised evidence of ASD in an attempt to mitigate criminal responsibility, 
either during sentencing or as a ground of appeal. This paper focuses on Australian cases because 
the early pioneering work by Freckleton and List (2009) and Freckleton (2011, 2013) examining 
the impact of ASD on criminal liability and sentencing laws in Australia has been largely 
unrepeated. This is despite the growth of equivalent legal and socio-legal scholarship in the 
United Kingdom and United States (Attwood et al., 2014; Dubin & Horowitz, 2017).  
We take an empirical approach to examining how the ASD diagnosis was considered 
during the court proceedings. This includes presenting summary narratives of each case that 
reflect how legal arguments and judicial discourse view the relationship between ASD 
symptomology and liability or sentences for alleged CEM offenses. In this respect, we 
intentionally build on McCay and Ryan (in press) by examining how ASD reflects and 
influences a growing body of thinking aligned with the emerging field of neurolaw, and its 
impact on ASD cases involving online activity. We also examine several related variables, 
including conceptions of risk associated with the offender and offense, how the custodial 
environment might affect each suspect in light of their ASD symptoms (Mann et al., 2018), 
related interventions and treatment, and the suitability of any available diversionary or 
supervisory measures as alternatives to imprisonment. 
The sample was derived from a systematic search on the Australian LexisNexis database 
using the terms “autism”, “autistic” and “Asperger”. These combined searches produced over 
1,500 hits dating back to the early 1980s. These cases spanned family law and foster care 
disputes, and various other non-criminal issues including appeals against confiscated firearms 
licenses. Each case was then manually screened to identify only criminal trials or appeals where 
the suspected offender raised evidence of an ASD diagnosis. Each criminal case was then further 
screened to identify only those relating to online sexual offending, including conduct related to 
CEM. Table 1 summarizes key features of our sample, based on the charges, the type of case, 
and the determination at trial or on appeal, including the sentence where this is discernible in 
each ruling. 
  
Table 1. Specific charges, case type and outcome of cases involving online sexual offending and 
an individual with an ASD 1 January 2017 – 1 May 2018  
Citation Charges Case type Outcome 
Vucemillo v 
Western Australia 
(2017) WASCA 37 
 
CEM possession; use of 
electronic 
communication with 
intent to procure a 
person believed to be 




Dennis v R (2017a) 
VSCA 75; (2017b) 
VSCA 251 
 
CEM access & 
possession; failing to 
comply with Sex 
Offender Registration 
Act 
Application for leave 




Initially allowed in 
full; subsequent 
appeal allowed in 
part & resentenced to 
3 years, 9 months 
R v Forrest (2017) 
NSWDC 241 
CEM possession & 
dissemination; 
transmitting indecent 
material to person <16 
(x4); use of carriage 
service to procure a 
person <16 for sexual 
activity 
Sentencing No more than 2 years 
imprisonment & 
assessed for intensive 
correction order 
 
R v Dundas (2017) 
QCA 107  
CEM access & 
possession 
Application for leave 
to appeal against 
sentence 
Dismissed 
R v Lane (2017) 
NSWDC 116 
CEM possession & 
dissemination 
Sentencing (special 
hearing as per Mental 
Health (Forensic 
Provisions) Act 1990) 
2 years, 7 months 
R v Cecchin (2017) 
SASCFC 109  
 
CEM access, possession 











(2017) FCA 1058  








(Qld) v Black 
(2018) QSC 29  
 









R v Formenton 
(2018) QCA 77  
 
CEM possession; use of 
carriage service to 
menace, harass or cause 
offense 
Application for leave 




The broad trends identified in Table 1 provide the framework for our analysis into how 
evidence of the suspect’s ASD is introduced in legal arguments to create or apply a formal legal 
precedent (Mann et al., 2018). Despite significant variability in the level of detail provided 
regarding these issues, our discussion builds on the work of Freckelton (2011, 2013) to 
interrogate how Australian criminal courts view the innate vulnerabilities associated with ASD in 
light of the countervailing protective requirements that underpin criminal prohibitions and 
various sentencing options involving online sexual offending.  
3 Theory 
 Neurolaw considers the way judges come to decisions in specific cases, through “an 
evaluation of the inferences of the Court about the offender’s capacities as a moral agent” and 
“in light of the existing legal principles that bear upon the decision” (McCay & Ryan, in press, p. 
2). In this respect, concerns regarding the legal impact of ASD, specifically in relation to CEM 
offences, can be bracketed under three core theoretical themes. 
3.1 Risk assessment  
Exploring sexuality on the internet through CEM offers some individuals with ASD an 
opportunity to learn about relationships and sexuality. This does not necessarily mean viewing 
CEM is a logical precursor to any form of sexual offending against a minor. However, the 
internet and contemporary sexuality can be a “lethal combination” for some individuals with 
ASD (Mahoney, 2009, p. 41). As with non-offensive activities, the desire for CEM can be 
excessive and compulsive for individuals with ASD (Mesibov & Sreckovic, 2017). As Sugrue 
(2017) indicates, there is an assumed, and potentially false, association between the level of risk 
a person poses to others, and the number and content of images collected. Therefore, it is 
generally assumed a greater number of images equates to a more severe obsession, which 
heightens the risk an individual with ASD will act on their sexual urges. Nevertheless, despite 
this widely held belief, findings from available empirical studies are not consistent with this 
association (Mahoney, 2009; Stabenow, 2011).  
This questionable assumption is particularly damaging for offenders with ASD as it fails to 
consider the association between the volume of CEM and the compulsive and obsessive features 
associated with the condition. Much anecdotal evidence shows individuals with ASD charged 
with CEM offenses often have thousands of images or videos in their possession, many of which 
remain unopened or are simply hoarded. There is no established link between consuming 
extreme sexual content and an increased risk of dangerousness (Osborn, Elliott, Middleton, & 
Beech, 2010).  
3.2 The custodial environment 
Allely’s (2015) review of four studies which investigated the experience of individuals with 
ASD within the prison environment highlighted the potential increased risk of bullying, 
confrontations, exploitation, anxiety and social isolation that are directly attributable to the 
inmates ASD traits, such as obsessions, social naivety and impaired empathy. In this respect, it 
would be expected that, where possible, diversion is considered either as an alternative to 
criminal prosecution or as a desirable disposition after conviction provided the person with ASD 
agrees and is able to meet certain supervisory conditions tailored to their needs. Some 
supervision orders may consist of employment and counselling while others might take the form 
of education, psychiatric care or job training. Diversion typically occurs at the pretrial stage, 
although in most cases can be recommended at any point during a formal trial (Dubin & 
Horowitz, 2017).  
However, there is also relatively little understanding about the most appropriate and 
effective treatment programs for offenders with ASD either within or outside a custodial 
environment (de la Cuesta, 2010; Higgs & Carter, 2015). Some previous studies have examined 
the effectiveness of, and challenges associated with, cognitive behavioral approaches in treating 
sexual offending for people with ASD (Murphy, Powell, Guzman, & Hays, 2007; Ray et al., 
2004) and evidence to date is not encouraging in relation to outcomes (Barkham, Gunasekaran, 
& Lovelock, 2013; Milton, Duggan, Latham, Egan, & Tantam, 2002). As such, while there is a 
questionable link between the use of CEM and actual risk of people diagnosed with ASD from 
engaging in sexual offences directed at children, there is also limited knowledge about 
appropriate supervision and treatment. Therefore, while considerations favorable to diversion 
might be met in individual cases, the moral approbation associated with any actual or virtual 
forms of sexual offending against children would suggest incarceration is a starting presumption 
during the sentencing phase. 
3.3 Malice 
 
Mogavero (2016) identified several studies suggesting a significant proportion of deviant 
or sexual offending amongst those with ASD is often driven by symptoms inherent to ASD as 
opposed to malice. This creates difficulties given such offenses cause physical and psychological 
harm to vulnerable victims and produce justifiable calls for rigorous criminal investigation and 
punishment (Debbaudt, 2004). However, mitigating factors must also be given appropriate 
weight during sentencing. This does not mean they should automatically lead to unduly lenient 
penalties disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. However, the absence of malice offers 
support for employing diversion particularly in relation to CEM offences (see Attwood et al., 
2014; Dubin & Horowitz, 2017), provided appropriate supervision of the offender is possible. 
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to strike an appropriate balance between these countervailing 
factors, given the competing nature of risk and vulnerability associated with the potential 
relationships between adult offenders with ASD, and prospective child victims in unsupervised 
contexts. 
The absence of malice appears at two intersecting levels. First, it might diminish liability 
for CEM offences, as the accused does not fully intend to engage in unlawful activity or is 
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. Second, the absence of malice might 
undermine two key objectives of punishment, namely specific deterrence and retribution, 
because the person diagnosed with ASD is not fully able to appreciate their relevance either in 
light of the offending or when attempting to negotiate conditions within the custodial 
environment. This might also have bearing on whether a person with ASD is able to express 
remorse, which is generally factored into decisions regarding these key objectives of punishment. 
Notably, judicial discourses regarding these key aspects of sentencing can often make 
problematic inferences from psychiatric evidence that skew the objectives of the punishment, or 
its relationship to the behavioral patterns of an accused of convicted person. (McCay & Ryan, in 
press).  
4 Results 
This section presents summaries of each case involving offenses of accessing, possessing 
and disseminating CEM and other related online sexual offenses. The summaries are quite 
detailed to capture the range of factors examined in court decisions regarding the nature of risk 
posed by the suspect, evidence of malice, and the impacts of different modes of punishment if a 
conviction is recorded. The cases in this sample often involved hundreds of images and videos 
which had been obtained over several years and were located on multiple devices in the 
offender’s home. Two cases involved police posing as young children and interacting with the 
offenders online prior to the seizure of the CEM. Our objective is to provide a detailed contextual 
account of the factual circumstances in each case, which focuses principally on the use of expert 
reports outlining the relationship between the suspect’s offending and identifiable psychiatric 
disorders, including symptoms consistent with ASD and related conditions. 
4.1 Vucemillo v Western Australia (2017) WASCA 37  
Laurence Vucemillo appealed his sentence for using electronic communications with intent 
to procure a person believed to be under 16 to engage in sexual activity, and possession of CEM. 
Vucemillo placed an advertisement on Craigslist for young girls in January 2015 and police 
responded by posing as a 14-year-old girl to obtain evidence of explicit sexual conversations. 
Vucemillo was arrested during an arranged meeting with the “young girl” and CEM was later 
found in his house. He was sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment, which was 
appealed in the present case. 
Ms. Zuin, a psychologist, observed that Vucemillo presented as emotionally detached, 
displayed a flat affect and exhibited a number of features consistent with Asperger's Syndrome, 
such as severe impairment with social interaction and restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior 
and interests. Although Vucemillo told Ms. Zuin he had a broad range of sexual interests and 
denied any specific interest in children, she reported that he appeared to have a marked interest 
in a variety of deviant sexual practices. He satisfied this deviancy by acquiring the CEM and 
trying to meet someone he believed to be role-playing as a 14-year-old girl. Ms. Zuin appeared to 
accept Vucemillo’s belief he was communicating with an adult rather than a minor, and it was 
likely he struggled to meet women through conventional means due to low self-confidence and 
impaired interpersonal skills. This meant he became increasingly reliant on the internet to 
communicate with others with similar sexual urges. Ms. Zuin found Vucemillo was at a 
moderate to high risk of reoffending with a limited prosocial support network and few social 
outlets. He rarely left his house and was dependent on sexually focused social networking sites 
for interaction, which were noted risk factors for reoffending.   
On 16 July 2016, the judge granted leave to appeal regarding the claim that Vucemillo 
was the victim of a miscarriage of justice because his ASD diagnosis occurred after sentencing 
and was therefore not considered when determining his criminal liability. This was so even 
though it was clear any prison sentence would prove to be unduly burdensome. A submission 
from Dr Brett, a psychiatrist, identified a causal link between Vucemillo’s offending and mental 
impairment, which affected his “moral culpability for the offending” (Vucemillo v Western 
Australia (2017) WASCA 37 para. 35). His expert testimony is worth reproducing at length. 
3. [Vucemillo’s] history and presentation was consistent with the mental disorder 
ASD (previously called Aspergers). He described and demonstrated deficits in 
social-emotional reciprocity. He had difficulties in making conversation … in the 
interview and he gave examples of this in the community. He also demonstrated 
deficits in non-verbal communication displaying a slightly restricted and incongruous 
affect. 
4. He demonstrated a lack of mind theory …. a core symptom in autism spectrum 
disorders. This is the inability to put yourself in someone else's shoes or to 
understand their perspective. 
5. He described deficits in developing, maintaining and understanding … familial, 
intimate and non-intimate relationships. He has no friends and no interest in other 
people. This is a core deficit in autism spectrum disorder and appears to be very 
significant in his offending behaviour. 
6. He finds it easier to communicate with people through his computer. He has met 
all of his intimate partners through his computer. He spends much of his time on his 
computer. People with autism spectrum disorder often find it easier to communicate 
with others this way as they do not need to interpret non-verbal gestures and can use 
emoticons to show emotions … 
8. I believe that [Vucemillo's] undiagnosed autism spectrum disorder is extremely 
significant in his offending behaviours. He is unable to form relationships. He uses 
the internet to try and make relationships. He has extremely concrete thinking. He is 
a stickler for rules and does not understand unwritten rules. His belief that the 
website was an adult only website is an example of how his autistic brain works 
(Vucemillo v Western Australia (2017) WASCA 37 para. 33). 
In line with Ms. Zuin’s assessment, Dr. Brett accepted Vucemillo’s denial of sexual interest in 
children and his false belief that he was communicating with an adult who was pretending to be a 
14-year-old girl. Dr. Brett went on to state that typically an individual with ASD would believe 
someone they were communicating with on an adult-only website would be an adult and would 
not consider the possibility it could be a minor. This “stunning naivety” (Vucemillo v Western 
Australia (2017) WASCA 37 para. 40) is consistent with an ASD diagnosis. Interestingly, Dr. 
Brett did not comment on Vucemillo's possession of CEM, and did not suggest ASD would 
explain sexually explicit communications with someone Vucemillo believed to be role-playing 
as a 14-year-old girl, the possession of images of young girls in sexually provocative poses, or 
his general sexual interest in young girls. The symptoms of ASD reported by Dr. Brett were 
synonymous and consistent with Asperger’s Syndrome as described by Ms. Zuin, and it was 
clear these were given prominent consideration during sentencing.  
During the appeal against sentence, Vucemillo also argued the combined sentence for the 
offenses infringed the totality principle as it did not reflect the proper relationship between the 
criminal conduct and his personal psychological circumstances. However, the original sentencing 
judge had considered these interrelated circumstances, there was no evidence prison would be 
more burdensome than non-custodial punishment, and the sentence would not have differed if 
Dr. Brett’s report had been available at the initial sentencing hearing. Vucemillo had also not 
shown any remorse and the appeal court considered the importance of specific deterrence and 
overall public safety when denying this appeal against sentence.  
4.2 Dennis v R (2017a) VSCA 75; (2017b) VSCA 251  
Two cases in this sample involve an application for leave to appeal and a full appeal by 
Stephen Dennis. Both cases were heard by the Victoria Supreme Court of Appeals and 
challenged a sentence of four years and six months imprisonment and permanent listing on the 
Victorian Register of Sex Offenders. The sentence resulted from convictions for accessing CEM 
using a carriage service (charge 1), failing to comply with reporting obligations under the Sex 
Offender Registration Act 2004 (Vic) (charge 2) and knowingly possessing CEM (charge 3). The 
police investigation led to the seizure of 1,410 images and 217 videos depicting mainly 
prepubescent children. Dennis voluntarily participated in a police interview and made admissions 
to the various CEM offenses. He revealed to police his use of CEM involved the following: 
(a) He had obtained the material from various websites and emails over 
approximately five years. 
(b) He had been viewing material of two young males lying on a bed, one naked, 
approximately one hour before the search warrant was executed. 
(c) He knew that the legal implications of owning child pornography were 'really bad' 
and said that 'you can get up to a long prison sentence'. 
(d) When asked why he accessed child pornography he stated: 'I don't know. I can't 
explain it. Just something in my head [thinks] it's good ... When I saw it, I think it 
looks good'. He said the violent images '[don't] do anything' but that when 'it's just a 
naked male ... I get a good feeling ... inside of me'. 
(e) He had tried to not download child pornography before but he said it's 'just like 
smoking' and he 'can't give it up'. 
(f) He said that it is not a sexual addiction, just an addiction that makes him 'feel 
good inside'. He said: 'I can't explain why it makes me feel good inside'. 
(g) He did not think that he could stop accessing child pornography without support 
(Dennis v R (2017b) VSCA 251 para. 8). 
The application for leave and the full appeals both relied on psychological reports 
tendered during the plea and sentencing. A report written by Mr. Cummins, a forensic 
psychologist, stated Dennis had “a very adolescent like interpersonal style” and presented as 
“quite a psychologically vulnerable person” (Dennis v R (2017b) VSCA 251 para. 30), which is 
consistent with a diagnosis of ASD. This report indicated that around the age of 16, Dennis 
experienced a significant head injury after a motorbike accident. Mr. Cummins also believed 
Dennis had mild anxiety and was moderately depressed but found no evidence his sexual 
offending had escalated, although he showed difficulties in expressing remorse. Mr. Cummins 
believed a custodial sentence was inappropriate and participation in a sex offender treatment 
program was important. Mr. Cummins stated Dennis’ risk of engaging in contact sexual 
offending was low and the risk of further CEM-related offenses was low to moderate. 
Dr. Clayer, a senior registrar in forensic psychiatry at the Victorian Institute of Forensic 
Mental Health, opined that Dennis may have had a specific learning disorder or a mild 
intellectual disability. While Dennis presented some features consistent with ASD, Dr. Clayer 
was unable to reach a firm diagnosis, but believed he had mild to moderate depression and 
intermittent anxiety. She also believed Dennis used CEM to regulate his emotions, fulfilled the 
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for pedophilia (see Beech, Miner, & Thornton, 2016; First, 2014; 
Moser, 2016) and would benefit from participating in a sex offender treatment program. Dennis’ 
risk of downloading and viewing CEM was assessed as moderate to high and he had previously 
“used child pornography as a means to regulate his emotions” (Dennis v R (2017b) VSCA 251 
para. 35).  
Mr. Jackson, a clinical neuropsychologist, reported that Dennis had several specific 
impairments, including a long-standing verbal learning disorder, an average range of basic 
perceptual executive skills, including poor perceptual planning and organization of more 
complex activities, and verbal executive skills generally in the extremely low to borderline 
range. Dennis was also unable to learn from his errors over the past three decades, which resulted 
in: 
… a neurophysiological condition that affects his ability to make reasoned decisions 
and appropriate judgements … [and] slowed processing speed. He is overwhelmed 
easily and does not take a lot of information in, which is also going to affect his 
ability to hold on to relevant information when making decisions. 
His thinking is black-and-white and he will have difficulty seeing other potential 
solutions ...  [and] his ability to think about possible outcomes or consequences of his 
actions will be impacted on and impaired. People with this type of profile have a high 
probability of reverting back to previously learnt behaviour and this does appear to 
be the case ... I am of the opinion that his neuropsychological condition would have a 
significant impact on his ability to remember and follow any obligations that are put 
on him and I believe that it … contributes to his breaches of his orders, including 
those related to the alleged sex offender (Dennis v R (2017b) VSCA 251 para. 32). 
Mr. Jackson stated these specific issues suggested two areas of brain damage in the left 
frontal and right temporal lobes that were probably due to the severe traumatic brain injury 
Dennis sustained as a teenager. However, he also believed this neurophysiological condition was 
not associated with the CEM offenses and found no evident disorder affecting Dennis’ impulse 
control, level of disinhibition, or which eroded his ability to understand the wrongfulness of his 
behavior. The following statement by Judge Lawson when imposing the initial sentence was 
reiterated during the application for leave to appeal and the final appeal. 
In terms of the offending relating to child pornography, [Mr. Jackson] considered 
that your condition is not related to that, other than you do have a condition that 
makes it somewhat difficult for you to learn from your mistakes. The actual issue of 
child pornography or paedophilia is not related to your neurophysiological condition 
(Dennis v R (2017a) VSCA 75 para. 20; (2017b) VSCA 251 para. 32). 
During the application for leave to appeal against the manifestly excessive nature of his 
sentence, Dennis argued Judge Lawson erred in finding charges 1 and 3 were serious and his 
level of criminal conduct was escalating. The Crown contended the sentence was reasonable 
because Dennis’ offending was serious and continued despite prior convictions for child-related 
offending in 2003 and 2004. The court agreed with Dennis, indicating his sentence “stands out” 
(Dennis v R (2017a) VSCA 75 para. 36) when compared to similar cases. It found his conduct 
appeared to be persistent rather than escalating to justify granting leave to appeal.  
The full appeal reheard these arguments in depth, with the Crown arguing the number, 
duration and type of materials accessed were evidence of serious offenses that justified the 
original sentence. Dennis claimed that despite understanding the wrongfulness of his actions, he 
was not as able to appreciate their severity and was less legally culpable than an individual 
without his neuropsychological condition. Based on the expert opinions of Mr. Cummins and 
Mr. Jackson regarding his lack of maturity and deficits in abstract reasoning, Dennis argued he 
had limited moral and legal culpability due to reduced insights into the wrongfulness of his 
conduct. However, the Crown also noted that despite previous convictions, Dennis had 
reoffended and questioned the causal link between the offending and his neuropsychological 
condition.  
The court ruled Dennis’ offending was serious in both scale and duration. He was aware 
his actions were unlawful and it was concluded there was an inadequate causal link between his 
psychological condition and offending. However, the court did find an error in the degree of 
concurrency in relation to charges 1 and 3 that made the aggregate sentence excessive, which led 
to a nine month sentence reduction. 
4.3 R v Forrest (2017) NSWDC 241  
David Forrest was convicted and awaiting sentence on four counts of using a carriage 
service to transmit indecent material to a person under the age of 16, using a carriage service to 
transmit CEM, using a carriage service to procure a person under the age of 16 for sexual 
activity, and possessing CEM. The offenses involved explicit online chats with young boys and 
took place between 2 July 2014 and 14 January 2015. Police made contact with Forrest by using 
the persona of a 14-year-old boy and later seized 499 images and 199 videos from his iPad and 
computer.  
A Community Corrections report documented that Forrest experienced several complex 
physical and emotional developmental problems from birth. He was born with extra digits that 
were surgically removed and experienced delays in speech development. The report also detailed 
the findings of a neuropsychological assessment performed in 2000, which found Forrest’s 
thinking and reasoning abilities were below 98% of adults of the same age. It was therefore 
possible Forrest experienced marked impairment in a wide range of situations requiring age-
appropriate thought and reasoning, including inability to fully understand social cues and 
anticipate the consequences of behavior. 
Forrest was also assessed by Associate Professor Woods, a consultant forensic 
psychologist, Dr. Kneebone, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Robinson, a clinical psychologist and sex 
offender counsellor who had engaged in several sessions with Forrest from November 2016 to 
March 2017. Associate Professor Woods indicated Forrest had fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder when he was 10-years-old, with a neuropsychological 
assessment at that time placing his cognitive function within the borderline range. Associate 
Professor Woods felt this finding was particularly important when considering the nature of 
Forrest’s actions. 
However, there was only partial agreement on a diagnosis consistent with ASD. 
According to a Static 99R Actuarial Risk Assessment, Forrest possessed some features that 
potentially contributed to his offending, including deficits in intimacy, problem-solving and 
general social rejection, which were attributable to his developmental problems. Dr. Kneebone 
did not accept Forrest had ASD, although he exhibited some key symptoms. He noted Forrest’s 
complex clinical history stemmed from the cluster of difficulties associated with his social 
isolation and immaturity. Forrest was aware his offending was unacceptable which would deter 
future reoffending, as would his experience of being in custody. However, his ongoing social 
isolation and cognitive difficulties had potential to raise a long-term risk of recidivism based on 
Forrest’s understanding of the character of his conduct. When specifically asked whether Forrest 
had any conditions which may have contributed to his actions, Dr. Kneebone stated:  
Mr Forrest’s neurodevelopmental disorders and poor social skills give rise to 
significant impairments of his ability to pick up on social cues or make social 
inference and anticipate the consequences of his behaviour. Furthermore, his low 
self-esteem renders Mr Forrest susceptible to pursuing avenues of gaining acceptance 
or validation from others, even if such methods involve deviant social activity. His 
cognitive and social difficulties are thought to contribute to his confusion about his 
sexual identity and his continual psychological denial (R v Forrest (2017) NSWDC 
241 para. 61). 
Dr. Robinson provided no clear determination regarding any particular intellectual 
impairment, or its relationship to Forrest’s actions. However, he did make a number of 
observations, which were also endorsed by Associate Professor Woods, that suggested Forrest 
would be at psychological and physical risk if incarcerated and recommended continued 
treatment to assist with his rehabilitation. 
Forrest claimed his diminished mental capacity should have been given greater 
consideration during sentencing. The Crown focused primarily on technical aspects of the New 
South Wales sentencing guidelines that determined the sentence was in parity with other similar 
cases based on the severity of the conduct and the need for general and specific deterrence. The 
Crown also questioned whether Forrest’s employment history and ability with computers might 
“sever the casual link between his disabilities and the offending” (R v Forrest (2017) NSWDC 
241 para. 118). The court found a custodial sentence of no more than two years imprisonment 
was appropriate and ordered a further assessment to determine the suitability of an intensive 
correction order. This view accepted the importance of several mitigating circumstances 
including the unplanned and unorganized nature of the offending, Forrest’s lack of criminal 
history, his good prospects of rehabilitation and reduced culpability which would also magnify 
the impact of a long custodial sentence. 
4.4 R v Dundas (2017) QCA 107  
Gary Dundas was convicted of using a carriage service to access and possess CEM. This 
case is particularly notable as it was found during the initial sentencing proceeding incarceration 
was likely to be onerous for Dundas because of his physical and psychiatric illnesses. Police 
found 36,711 images and 523 videos stored on nine different devices and evidence of three 
videos downloaded from file-sharing websites. Dundas was sentenced to two years imprisonment 
with release permitted after six months with a community-based good behavior requirement for 
three additional years.  
Although the sentencing judge accepted Dundas had been diagnosed with Asperger's 
Syndrome and a hoarding disorder by Dr. Gills, a treating psychiatrist, he claimed the original 
sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the impact of his Asperger’s Syndrome and 
related medical conditions, which could not be adequately managed whilst incarcerated. He also 
claimed the sentence was excessive because it was not in line with other comparable cases, he 
had no prior criminal history, had fully cooperated with authorities by allowing his property to be 
searched and by entering a guilty plea, and his hoarding disorder could partly explain why some 
of the CEM, which was in the lowest category of severity, had been kept for such a long time 
despite appearing to have been accessed regularly.  
The Crown argued the aggregate number of images, which included 133 severe images 
and 100 videos depicting actual sexual activity, were accumulated over almost a decade and 
stored on multiple devices. The court found all mitigating circumstances were appropriately 
considered by the sentencing judge, and Dundas had not demonstrated his sentence was 
excessive when compared to other similar cases. There is relatively little discussion of how the 
ASD diagnosis contributed to the offending behavior compared with most other cases identified 
in this study.  
4.5 R v Lane (2017) NSWDC 116  
This case was a Special Hearing for sentencing under section 21 of the Mental Health 
(Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW). John Lane was charged with the possession and 
dissemination of CEM, which included 5,980 images and 54 videos stored on his mobile phone. 
In June 2015, Lane was found not fit to plead and referred to the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal. In November 2015, the Tribunal held Lane would not become fit to plead within the 
next 12 months due to his fixation on prior convictions for acts of indecency towards persons 
under the ages of ten and 16 years-of-age. He believed these convictions were wrongful and 
refused to discuss them. In February 2016, a Tribunal member indicated a Special Hearing was 
needed. This occurred in October 2016 and Lane was found guilty of both CEM charges. Three 
psychological reports by Ms. Robilliard, a forensic psychologist, Dr. Martin and Dr. Allnutt were 
central in determining Lane’s fitness to stand trial and appropriate sentence.  
Ms. Robilliard assessed Lane on the boundary of low to average intelligence and 
suggested a provisional diagnosis of ASD. Dr. Martin’s assessment was consistent with this 
finding, adding the possibility of an underlying psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia. 
However, Lane’s offending and previous criminal history indicated an underlying paraphilic 
disorder, or pedophilia. Dr. Allnutt considered Lane was not fit to stand trial due to his 
pathological fixation with his previous convictions, which were possibly attributable to ASD. 
However, the Crown submitted there was no causal connection between any recognized mental 
illness and Lane’s offending, arguing that the “offender's condition did not impact upon his 
moral culpability in relation to possessing or disseminating child abuse material” (R v Lane 
(2017) NSWDC 116 para. 28). In other words, Lane was aware possessing the images was a 
criminal offense because he tried to hide the CEM and lied to police about losing his mobile 
phone. 
Lane argued these reports established a direct relationship between ASD and his behavior 
that should have been considered during sentencing. His ASD had “significant implications for 
his capacity and ability to understand social interactions, to appreciate another person's 
perspective, to adjust his behavior appropriately, and to interact successfully with others” (R v 
Lane (2017) NSWDC 116 para. 37), which in turn “lowered his legal culpability” for the CEM 
offenses (R v Lane (2017) NSWDC 116 para. 38). In contrast, the Crown emphasized the 
objective seriousness of the offenses, including the volume of CEM stored in itemized folders on 
his mobile phone, the need for both specific and general deterrence despite the limited value of 
specific deterrence to someone with ASD, and Lane’s apparent failure to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct. Lastly, the Crown maintained Lane had an unhealthy sexual interest 
in young boys, and the court was obliged to consider his prior convictions for committing acts of 
indecency towards children. The court conceded Lane’s charge of disseminating CEM involved 
a single image and was within the lower end of the range of severity. However, in emphasizing 
the need for both specific and general deterrence, the court sentenced Lane to four months 
imprisonment for disseminating CEM and two years and three months for the possession of 
CEM. 
4.6 R v Cecchin (2017) SASCFC 109  
David Cecchin appealed a seven years and five months sentence of imprisonment with a 
non-parole period of four years and six months for two counts of aggravated possession of CEM, 
two counts of aggravated dissemination of CEM and aggravated access to CEM. Cecchin 
claimed his sentence was manifestly excessive for a first-time offender who suffered from ASD 
who was assessed as a low risk of reoffending, lacked prior convictions and was young at the 
time of the offenses. He also argued the sentence failed to recognize concurrency given the 
factual circumstances of the offending, and the judge speculated about his prospect of 
reoffending despite the lack of evidence to this effect.  
The ruling emphasized Cecchin’s Asperger's Syndrome which was diagnosed in 1996. 
Dr. Begg, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Young, a psychologist with expertise in ASD, indicated 
Cecchin had a pedophilic disorder but presented a low risk of reoffending, even though he had 
little or no insight into his offending and did not appreciate its enormity. This report was 
submitted during the initial sentencing hearing. However, the judge did not accept Cecchin’s 
explanations for his actions and endorsed the Crown argument that the offending was extremely 
serious, and the sentence was within an acceptable range. This ruling was ultimately overturned 
as the sentences were outside the acceptable range and wrongfully made cumulative. Cecchin 
was resentenced to four years with a non-parole period of two years and three months.  
4.7 Westlake v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (2017) FCA 1058  
Daniel Westlake was convicted of two counts of using a carriage service to access CEM, 
two counts of using a carriage service to make CEM available and possessing CEM. He was 
sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment and was eligible for parole on 29 March 
2017. However, he was refused parole by a delegate of the Federal Court of Australia after a 
recommendation by Queensland Corrective Services (QCS). Evidence indicated he had not 
completed a sex offender treatment program, had outstanding rehabilitation needs and had not 
secured appropriate post-release accommodation. Westlake sought judicial review of this 
decision.  
Several mental health reports were tendered in Westlake’s support, including those by his 
clinical psychologist, Professor Attwood, child and adolescent consultant psychiatrist, Dr. Ross, 
and clinical psychologist, Ms. Lewis. Although the judge described the case as a very difficult 
sentencing exercise, a bare minimum was reached with a relatively low non-parole period to 
reflect Westlake’s strong subjective circumstances, which included:  
cooperation with investigating police; timely guilty pleas; a prior unblemished 
record; a sad personal history arising from recently diagnosed Asperger's Syndrome, 
sexual abuse suffered as a child and certain other medical conditions; an assessment 
of a low risk of reoffending; a finding that [Westlake] was not a suitable vehicle for 
general deterrence by reason of his mental condition; a finding that imprisonment 
would be especially burdensome on [Westlake]; and, substantial efforts in advancing 
rehabilitation, including by obtaining treatment (Westlake v Attorney-General of the 
Commonwealth (2017) FCA 1058 para. 17). 
Westlake argued this favorable view at sentencing was contradicted by the QCS 
assessment. Specifically, the Federal Court delegate should have challenged the parole report to 
explore why the sex offender program had not been completed and why the residential address 
provided was considered inappropriate. However, neither the facts nor the relevant legislation 
supported these contentions, as there was no legal obligation for the court to consider any issues 
outside the parole board’s report. Westlake’s application was consequently dismissed.  
4.8 Attorney-General (Qld) v Black (2018) QSC 29 
Stephen Black was originally convicted of four counts of using a carriage service for 
transmitting CEM to himself and possessing CEM. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment 
with a non-parole period of two years and six months and released into the community on 8 
February 2015 on a supervision order with 40 conditions that was due to expire in 2021. 
However, Black broke the order in June 2016, pled guilty, and was sentenced to three months 
imprisonment which was wholly suspended, then released from custody under the same 
supervision order. He then broke this supervision order twice after contacting two women and 
their children, pled guilty to these breaches and was sentenced to four months imprisonment in 
addition to the three month suspended term. The hearing in our sample placed the onus on Black 
to prove the existing supervision order was adequate to protect the community and justified his 
release into the community despite these previous contraventions.  
Dr. Beech and Dr. Aboud provided expert testimony to the court. Dr. Aboud diagnosed 
Black with a non-exclusive type of pedophilia involving sexual urges towards prepubescent 
females and possible hebephilia, which refers to persistent sexual urges for pubescents. Black 
also presented with antisocial personality disorder with marked traits of psychopathy and 
features consistent with mild ASD or Asperger’s Syndrome. Black had a history of pathological 
gambling, alcohol, cannabis and opiate abuse that reflected tendency to “deceive and manipulate 
… to minimise and externalise responsibility … [despite] at times present[ing] as a rather 
socially clumsy” individual (Attorney-General (Qld) v Black (2018) QSC 29 para. 16). Dr. 
Aboud also stated Black had:  
poor adaptive coping and problem solving skills … impulsivity … demonstrated 
poor judgment …[and] underlying psycho-social difficulties associated with his 
mildly autistic features that frustrate his social and communication style (Attorney-
General (Qld) v Black (2018) QSC 29 para. 20). 
Based on the expert reports, the court was satisfied Black had established the supervision 
order was sufficient to protect the community as his risk of sexual reoffending was considered 
low to moderate. Evidence of ASD, including impairments to his capacity for concrete thought 
and social clumsiness, were considered to contribute to Black’s offending and his overall 
presentation, which exhibited several comorbid psychopathological traits. However, reference to 
mild ASD is potentially problematic as it seems to suggest the symptoms are in some way non-
impairing or limit the perceived contribution of the disorder and its key symptoms to the breach 
of Black’s order. In other words, those with mild ASD can hold down a successful job, and are 
highly articulate and intelligent, but may also have impaired abilities to appreciate, understand or 
empathize with other people that may not be fully understood by those with little or no 
experience of ASD. The discourses in this ruling suggest ASD is a spectrum from mild to severe, 
rather than a disorder with varying domains of strengths and difficulties experienced by 
individuals in very different ways.  
4.9 R v Formenton (2018) QCA 77  
Jonathon Formenton was convicted of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause 
offense (offense 1) and possessing CEM (offense 2). Police seized 907 images and five videos 
from his mobile phone. For the first offense, Formenton was released on probation for two years 
without proceeding to a conviction, subject to a $500 recognizance for good behavior. He was 
also required to undertake specified treatment under the direction of his probation officer. The 
second offense resulted in a 12 month prison sentence that was wholly suspended for two years. 
He sought leave to appeal these dispositions. 
Formenton was assessed by several clinical experts. Dr. Keane found evidence of 
impairment with executive functioning, which would have an adverse impact on Formenton’s 
ability to use intact cognitive resources in a consistent and predictable manner, which in turn 
may affect his social behavior. Professor McCombe, a neurologist, could not make a clear 
neurological diagnosis in December 2015, but considered the possibility Formenton had long-
standing cognitive problems, which was also endorsed by Dr. Calder-Potts, a psychiatrist, who 
noted Formenton minimized his offenses relating to the possession of CEM.  
Despite attending university, Formenton had a low IQ, was experiencing problems 
meeting academic requirements and was easily influenced and manipulated by others, all of 
which are symptoms consistent with ASD. Dr. Gardner, a clinical neuropsychologist, had met 
Formenton several times and found he lacked understanding and forethought regarding his CEM 
offense, and exhibited shock when she told him of behaviors considered to be unlawful. Dr. 
Robertson, a psychiatrist, believed Formenton had Asperger's Syndrome.  
The judge accepted Dr. Gardner’s report, emphasizing Formenton’s lack of appreciation 
“the images that he was downloading were wrong and horrific was concerning, particularly given 
what [Formenton] had achieved, albeit with academic difficulties, as a person of his age” (R v 
Formenton (2018) QCA 77 para. 11). However, this view reflects a common misconception 
about defendants with ASD, as many people do not understand or believe someone who is well-
educated, articulate, intelligent, or possesses an average or above average intelligence, can also 
be emotionally and socially impaired. The Crown highlighted a report by Ms. Bardsley, who was 
involved in Formenton’s sex offender course, which indicated he “felt like a child in an adult's 
body and had no idea how to be physically intimate with someone of his own chronological age” 
(R v Formenton (2018) QCA 77 para. 25). This helped explain why Formenton was sexually 
aroused by CEM, which reinforced the delusional belief the images were not real. This lack of 
appreciation of the consequences of his offenses demonstrated his need for instant gratification, 
which compensated for his lack of knowledge and experience with age-appropriate relationships. 
Although he knew his actions were wrong, Formenton was unable to “progress along the 
continuum of intimacy in reality” (R v Formenton (2018) QCA 77 para. 25).  
Formenton claimed his sentence was manifestly excessive as insufficient weight was 
given to his successful completion of a sex offender’s program prior to sentencing, his low risk 
of reoffending, the absence of prior convictions, his youth, and the overall negative impact of a 
conviction. He argued a three year probation order with 240 hours of community service was 
more appropriate. However, the Crown argued this sentence “struck the proper balance between 
the seriousness of the offence and [Formenton’s] rehabilitation” (R v Formenton (2018) QCA 77 
para. 27). The court agreed and refused leave to appeal, stating relevant personal circumstances 
had been considered by the sentencing judge, and the seriousness and scale of Formenton’s 
conduct warranted a conviction. 
5 Discussion 
The cases identified in this paper reinforce a number of limits of judicial discourse that have 
been established in equivalent studies into neurolaw (McCay & Ryan, in press). It highlights that 
courts consider a wide range of issues when faced with defendants diagnosed with ASD who are 
charged with online sexual offenses and the possession or distribution of CEM. This includes the 
relative weight given to the diagnosis against the severity or persistence of the offending (R v 
Lane, 2017), the imposition of a cumulative rather than concurrent sentence (R v Cecchin, 2017), 
and various other factors commonly leading to a mild recalibration of a sentence on appeal, 
including the degree of cooperation with authorities, a plea of guilty, displays of remorse, and 
evidence of strong rehabilitation prospects (Dennis v R, 2017b; R v Forrest, 2017; R v Lane, 
2017). The viability of any interim or ongoing formal supervision to limit repeat offending whilst 
on parole is also relevant (Westlake v Attorney General of the Commonwealth, 2017).  
The overwhelming majority of psychological reports tendered in evidence in the present 
sample affirm the view the possession of extreme sexual material is not always an indication of 
deviant sexuality and can involve a form of “counterfeit deviance” in offenders with ASD that 
satisfies a naive curiosity (Mahoney, 2009, p. 21; see also Hingsburger, Griffiths, & Quinsey, 
1991). However, these impacts are seldom given credence in formal legal decisions that 
determine criminal liability or might lead to a non-custodial sentence. In fact, there is limited 
discussion of the impact of ASD on the actual nature of offending throughout this sample (R v 
Dundas, 2017), and several cases revealed a problematic misconception in the judicial reasoning 
that mild ASD or a relatively high intelligence equates to full cognitive functioning (Attorney-
General (Qld) v Black, 2017; R v Formenton, 2018), which in turn justifies attributing full legal 
responsibility for the alleged crimes. Despite these limits, Australian courts are cognizant of the 
latitude associated with ASD diagnoses, and the need for greater knowledge and understanding 
of the relationship between ASD symptoms and online sexual offending. The following quote 
offers a pertinent illustration of these difficulties. 
Although it may be accepted that [Formenton] was afflicted by a mental disorder 
and/or Asperger's Syndrome, was young and naïve and unlikely to re-offend in light 
of his rehabilitation efforts for the State Offence, while another judge may have 
imposed a more lenient sentence, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive 
(R v Formenton (2018) QCA 77 para. 66). 
The absence of major sentencing reductions on appeal illustrates the depth of 
consideration of detailed psychological reports during the initial sentencing phase. However, our 
analysis also identifies several issues prosecutors, defense counsel and courts must consider 
when reconciling the conflicting interests of suspects diagnosed with ASD and the broader 
protection of the community. These reflect a discursive emphasis that indicates certain 
characteristics of those diagnosed with ASD might be considered less relevant when determining 
their level of risk to the community, the risk of reoffending, the willingness to impose a custodial 
sentence in light of relevant specific and general deterrence requirements of sentencing law, and 
the general difficulties in determining malice. We discuss each of these issues in turn. 
5.1 Risk 
  
The misconception between virtual and actual risk points to the need for the adaptation of 
current principles for sentencing in CEM cases when the defendant has an ASD. Many leading 
Australian cases (Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v D’Alessandro, 2010; Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Garside, 2016; R v De Leeuw, 2015) set out detailed principles for 
sentencing in CEM cases which attempt to determine the objective seriousness of this type of 
offending, yet fail to consider the corresponding impact of ASD. The “unanimous support” 
(Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v D’Alessandro (2010) VSCA 60 para. 21; Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Garside (2016) VSCA 74 para. 24) given to the number and length 
of time images were possessed when determining the severity of an offense or length of custodial 
sentence is extremely problematic for individuals with ASD. The possibility an individual with 
ASD will victimize minors is also limited, as their social awkwardness generally makes them 
unattractive to children and their naivety will make it difficult for them to manipulate potential 
child victims (Mahoney, 2009). This combination of factors suggests individuals with ASD pose 
less risk of reoffending, and any “risk of further offending by an ASD individual, especially after 
appropriate intervention, is less than the risk posed by a neurotypical offender” (Sugrue, 2017, 
p.130).  
R v Forrest ((2017) NSWDC 241 para. 67) is a rare example demonstrating judicial 
acceptance that “established Risk Assessment measures are not validated for internet-based sex 
offences” and “should not be used to assess risk of re-offence and potential for rehabilitation”. 
Yet in Attorney-General (Qld) v Black (2018), Dr. Aboud employed a variety of risk assessment 
instruments, including the Static 99R Risk Matrix 2000/S, which have been found valid in 
predicting the risk of reoffending. Scores on these risk assessments indicated Black was a very 
high, high or medium risk for reoffending. On the Psychopathy Checklist, Black scored 27/40, 
which is a relatively high score but not above the cut-off for diagnosing psychopathy. On the 
Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol instrument, Dr. Aboud found Black had several positive 
scores, including problems with self-awareness, stress, coping, intimate relationships and non-
intimate relationships, planning and supervision. Dr. Aboud considered Black’s overall risk of 
sexual offending was high, while his risk of escalating to contact-based sexual offending was 
significantly lower. Various issues were considered when drawing these conclusions, including 
Black’s “underlying psycho-social difficulties associated with his mildly autistic features that 
frustrate his social and communication style” (Attorney-General (Qld) v Black (2018) QSC 29 
para. 20).  
While experts consider the diagnosis of ASD when assessing the level of risk in most 
cases, how this is done is yet to be standardized. It is reasonable to assume different experts use 
varied or inconsistent risk assessment techniques. The level of risk in most cases in this sample 
was measured as high. However, current risk assessment tools do not consider the impact of 
ASD symptomology, and the measured level of risk may not accurately reflect the real risk an 
individual with ASD poses. It remains unclear how forensic mental health experts who testified 
in the cases presented in this sample factored this in when completing their assessment of each 
suspect. Moreover, none of the case reports explicitly point to any discussion or consideration 
that the level of risk may be lower as a result of the ASD independently of the results from these 
formal risk assessment tools. There is also no single risk assessment instrument specifically for 
ASD, or where CEM is the sole offense. Thus, conventional risk assessments are typically used 
as part of the forensic analysis where the only offenses are receipt, possession or dissemination 
of CEM, while clinicians and criminal justice professionals must rely on research that is limited 
in drawing an empirical connection between ASD and a propensity to access CEM. Therefore: 
[i]n the absence of validated instruments for assessing recidivistic risk, we are forced 
to turn to existing research literature, which, unfortunately, is sparse when it comes 
to CP [child pornography] use and people on the spectrum. Instead, we are forced to 
rely on research based on neurotypicals and extrapolate based on what we know 
about ASD (Sugrue, 2017, p. 126).  
One notable variable missing from these assessments is the relative ease with which CEM 
can be accessed through electronic technologies. Thus, any risk assessment places exclusive 
responsibility on the individual, while negating the influence of the ready availability of CEM 
through the world wide web.  
5.2 Impact of the custodial environment  
Several cases in this sample highlight the negative impact of imprisonment on defendants 
with ASD. This includes consideration of the particular vulnerabilities certain individuals 
experience regarding exploitation and abuse. However, it is rare for these factors to be sufficient 
to displace the countervailing legal demands for a term of imprisonment, which is usually 
justified through a combination of specific and general deterrence. For example, in Dennis v R 
(2017b), Mr. Jackson acknowledged the negative implications of recording a conviction and 
imposing a sentence of “imprisonment or any other penalty”, given: 
[h]e will be slow to process what people are saying to him in prison, he will be 
overwhelmed and miss detail and he will have difficulty learning routines, etc. This would 
place him at significant risk of 'getting into trouble' from staff and other prisoners for not 
learning the rules and routines of the prison system. Because of his poor verbal executive 
skills, he would certainly miss any nuances [in] what people are saying to him and will 
take people very literally. He could potentially be at risk of being used by other prisoners 
to do their 'dirty work' because of his literal thinking … [Dennis] would certainly be at risk 
of exacerbating any current mood condition that he has if he is sent to prison (Dennis v R 
(2017b) VSCA 251 para. 33). 
The original sentencing judge in Dennis v R (2017a) referred to the opinions of three 
experts, Mr. Cummins, Dr. Clayer and Mr. Jackson. The following quote aptly synthesizes the 
consolidated views of the potentially negative impact of imprisonment in this case. 
You present as a psychologically immature and vulnerable person. ... It will be 
difficult for you in custody and that may impact with a deterioration in your mental 
health condition … I have taken into consideration the fact that imprisonment will be 
more burdensome for you than the ordinary gaol inmate and also there is a risk of 
your mental health deteriorating (Dennis v R (2017a) VSCA 75 para. 50). 
Similarly, in R v Cecchin ((2017) SASCFC 109 para. 28), the sentencing judge found 
Cecchin’s ASD contributed to his generally socially naïve state, which in turn would make him 
“more vulnerable in prison”. In R v Forrest (2017), Associate Professor Woods noted the deep 
traumatization caused by Forrest’s previous experiences in custody, which exposed him to 
physical and sexual assaults and the ensuing psychological risks. In Vucemillo v Western 
Australia (2017), Dr. Brett discussed particular vulnerabilities to exploitation in the prison 
setting and stated a lesser sentence would have been imposed if the ASD diagnosis was available 
for the original sentencing judge. Finally, imprisonment for two years with release to occur after 
six months in R v Dundas (2017) was a direct legacy of the evidence of ASD. 
Whilst I accept that some of the medical conditions you suffer can be appropriately 
managed in custody, it seems to me that there will nevertheless be some adverse 
consequence for you beyond what will be -- what would be the norm for a person 
being sentenced to imprisonment, and, certainly, your psychological diagnosis is 
likely to be a significant impact on you beyond the norm. What that means is that it is 
... something that should be taken account of in the sentencing process, and there 
should be some mitigation of the penalty to reflect that that will be more onerous on 
you even though you will be sentenced to a period of actual imprisonment (R v 
Dundas (2017) QCA 107 para. 12). 
These views are consistent with expert opinion in other justice administration contexts, 
even though, as this sample attests, they are not always accepted in judicial discourse to justify 
implementing a non-custodial term or diversion for offenders who suffer from ASD (Cooper & 
Allely, 2017; Mann et al., 2018). In fact, the present sample reveals this is particularly 
complicated when imprisonment is the benchmark for criminal punishment and community 
protection in CEM and substantive offences involving children, with several cases pointing to the 
inadequacy of current supervisory and surveillance options to limit the risk young men with ASD 
might engage in more problematic sexual behavior (see Westlake v Attorney-General of the 
Commonwealth, 2017). 
While not specific to people with ASD, diversion requires inventive forms of monitoring 
outside the custodial setting to minimize the kinds of public stigma associated with certain forms 
of sexual misbehavior that commonly stem from community notification and sex offender 
registration requirements (Logan, 2009). This also requires expanding employment and pro-
social community activities to enhance a person’s integration after serving a custodial sentence. 
The findings in this sample suggest non-custodial forms of supervision are considered to some 
degree (see R v Formenton, 2018), but their availability as meaningful pre-trial or post-
conviction options is presently quite limited. Moreover, the stigma of conviction itself magnifies 
the need to consider diversion in more cases, specifically as there is limited evidence CEM 
offenses evolve into a pattern of more serious contact-based sex offending (Allely & Dubin, 
2018).  
5.3 Malice, intervention and treatment 
Previous literature points to a contradiction between the degree of malice underpinning 
many forms of offending by people with serious mental conditions, and the conflation of legal 
and moral accountability for wrongdoing (McCay & Ryan, in press). These factors are evident in 
the current sample, and reinforce previous research that highlights problems in attributing the full 
scale of legal intention for conduct that can equally be attributed to a diagnosis of ASD 
(Freckleton 2011; 2013). Various expert statements in the present sample regarding the 
suitability of certain forms of treatment that can have bearing on the ultimate question of malice, 
and its significance in determining whether a sentence of imprisonment is warranted in any given 
case. While the impact of certain treatments on judicial decision-making requires further 
research, it is clear from the present sample that some forms of treatment are incompatible with 
beliefs about men diagnosed with ASD to self-govern in absence of ongoing supervision either 
within or outside the custodial setting. For example, Mr. Jackson in Dennis v R (2017b) 
suggested that narrative therapy was unlikely to be successful due to Dennis’ cognitive 
impairments. 
Left to his own devices in the community, from a neuropsychological perspective, 
there is a reasonably high probability of returning to previously learnt behaviour, 
given his difficulties learning new behaviour. The best way this can be managed is 
by having a supportive structure around him. If he was not to return to live with his 
former partner, then it may well be better for him to live in supported 
accommodation rather than just live on his own ... 'Treatment' would best be 
provided in the form of structure and support from organisations and others in the 
community to assist him in his day-to-day functioning, meeting his obligations and 
potentially try to learn new skills simply by learning new routines with repetition 
(Dennis v R (2017b) VSCA 251 para. 34). 
The sentencing judge in this case also referred to Mr. Jackson’s opinion that a positive 
rehabilitation outcome would be more likely in a supportive structure that considered Dennis’ 
deficits. In other words, if imprisonment is considered too severe, courts must be convinced there 
is an adequate support and supervision structure that appears able to prevent reoffending, or at 
the very least improve an individual’s capacity for autonomous self-governance and desistence. 
There is limited likelihood that malice, deterrence or retribution comes into this type of equation. 
Rather, it is more aligned with satisfying judicial concerns that adequate supervision of a person 
convicted of CEM offences can take place in the community. This reasoning might lend itself to 
validating incarceration as a default position, given the general absence of ongoing community 
supports for many individuals experiencing ASD and convicted of CEM or substantive sexual 
offences. 
In Westlake v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (2017), Professor Attwood 
emphasized a variant of this problem when describing the need for prison authorities to be aware 
of the impact of Westlake’s symptoms when administering group treatments. The report stated:  
I understand that he will be required to engage in the treatment programs designed 
for those in prison who have been found guilty of particular offences. It is essential 
that whoever is running those groups is aware of the nature of Asperger's Syndrome 
and how it will affect group participation. [Westlake] will have a general difficulty 
with regard to self-disclosure and especially, converting his thoughts, emotions and 
experiences into speech. This was clearly a characteristic in the therapy sessions with 
[Westlake] that I have had in the past. This is not [Westlake] being non-compliant 
and resistant to therapy but a genuine difficulty with group dynamics, participation 
and disclosure (Westlake v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (2017) FCA 
1058 para. 21). 
Similarly, in Vucemillo v Western Australia ((2017) WASCA 37 para. 33), the judge referred to 
Dr. Brett’s concern Vucemillo’s “sexual deviancy was not thoroughly explored” in relation to 
available treatment measures while in custody. The narrative went on to state: 
In my experience in working with young men with autism, their fantasy world can be 
very different to what occurs in reality. [Vucemillo] did describe some worrying 
fantasies. I would recommend that these be explored in individual counselling 
sessions with someone with experience in autism and sexuality (Vucemillo v Western 
Australia (2017) WASCA 37 para. 33). 
Lastly, the report by Dr. Robinson in R v Forrest (2017) indicated there was no appropriate 
treatment available in custody. Instead, the most effective forms of one-on-one therapy or small 
group-based sex offender interventions were only offered within the general community. 
However, given such treatments are rare in the closed supervisory environments of prison, there 
are a series of related concerns about how their effectiveness might be managed, identified or 
their limitations pre-empted in the general community. In other words, while treatment is a 
necessary emphasis either within or outside the prison context, its impact in promoting 
meaningful self-regulating behavior, or enhancing the level of community supervision of people 
with ASD and prior CEM offences is likely to be limited, absent other forms of support that are 
rarely canvassed in judicial discussions regarding this type of offending. 
6 Conclusion  
The sample examined in this study indicates some individuals with a propensity to access 
CEM may be subject to enhanced surveillance that leads to criminal prosecution and a custodial 
sentence for hoarding this material. However, such behavior does not necessarily evolve into or 
equate with a higher risk of engaging in more serious forms of sexual offending. It also raises 
many questions about intention, culpability, rehabilitation and remorse that add to the growing 
body of literature on the nature, application and discursive factors underpinning neurolaw and its 
relationship to conventional legal principles governing criminal liability and sentencing. It is 
important when determining criminal liability and sentences for individuals with an ASD 
convicted of online sexual offenses, including those specifically related to CEM, to limit, as far 
as possible, the harmful impacts of a formal conviction, and maximize prospects of an offender’s 
treatment, rehabilitation and social integration through the non-punitive capacity of diversionary 
supervision. The cases in this sample suggest Australian courts have a considerable way to go to 
meet this diversionary objective, as a richer series of community-based supervision and 
treatment requirements is developed. However, the sophistication of the discourses surrounding 
ASD and further research into judicial discourses in CEM and related offenses provides a solid 
foundation to achieve the dual objectives of community protection and rehabilitation for men 
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